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The Constitutionality of Subdivision
Exactions for Educational
Purposes
BY HARVEY A. FELDMAN*
Within the last year state and federal courts, beginning with
the California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest,' have ruled that
the principle of "fiscal neutrality" in the financing of the nation's
public school systems demands that the present predominant fi-
nancing method, the local real property tax,2 be declared unconsti-
tutional.3 The decisions, based on the twin determinations that
* B.A., 1966, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1969, Dickinson
School of Law; Assistant Professor of Law, Dickinson School of Law.
1. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (1971).
2. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTY STATES' REIMBURSEMENT
PLANS, 1968-69 performed for the Pennsylvania Department of Education's
Bureau of Research revealed, inter alia: (1) local contributions underwrite
52% of all educational costs; (2) twenty-one states depend on local con-
tributions to finance more than 60% of their total education bill, for four
states the percentage is over 70%, and for one it is over 80%; (3) the
proportion of local education revenues raised from the real property tax
range from 65% in Louisiana to 100% in Missouri, New York, Rhode Island,
Texas, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mas-
sachuetts, Michigan and Wisconsin; (4) for 3/5 of the states, the real prop-
erty tax raises more than 90% of local education funds; (5) only Hawaii,
with its completely centralized system, avoids substantial reliance on the
local real property tax. An article in the Philadelphia Inquirer for
February 6, 1972, reported at H-2 that 98% of local contributions derive
from the property tax. See also STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1970 at 121.
3. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp.
280 (W.D. Tex. 1971); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn.
1971); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241
education is a "fundamental interest which cannot be conditioned
on wealth"4 and that there is "no compelling state purpose neces-
sitating the present method of financing," come at a time when
burgeoning school populations and galloping inflation have forced
expenditures unrelentingly upward. A recent Department of
Transportation study estimated that busing alone added $1.5 bil-
lion to the nation's education bill last year. 6 Although the study
attributed less than 1% of the increase to desegregation, 7 one must
assume that eventually Swanm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education8 and its off-spring,9 particularly the metropolitan area
desegregation plan formulated in Bradley v. School Board,10 will
have a significant impact on the distribution and expenditure of
school funds. Since twenty-three other suits challenging the prop-
erty tax are pending in other jurisdictions,11 substitute methods of
school financing will have to be found.
One recent proposal suggested that the federal government in-
crease its share of education contributions from 7% (approxi-
mately $3.3 billion) to 30% (between $12 billion and $15 billion) .12
Although Senator George McGovern and others13 have suggested
that reformation of the present federal income tax structure would
produce the needed revenue, earlier administration proposals cen-
tered on a new 21/2-3% value added tax1 4 to raise $18 billion.
About $5 billion would then be used in a rebate plan to offset the
tax's regressive features. 15 However, the value added tax has re-
ceived much criticism, 16 and its Congressional future appears bleak.
A study undertaken by the President's Commission on School Fi-
(1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972) (state
constitution). But cf. Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (D. Va.
1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 44; McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (D.
Ill.), aff'd mem., McInnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1968); See generally
Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1220 (1971).
4. Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604, 487
P.2d 1241, 1243 (1971).
5. Id. The court also ruled that state programs of equalization aid
and supplemental aid were not sufficient counterweights to the inequities
caused by the property tax system.
6. N.Y. Times, April 12, 1972 at 1.
7. Id.
8. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
9. See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 338 F. Supp. 582 (E.D. Mich. 1971)
(reversed in part, affirmed in part, remanded for a hearing on the merits,
438 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1972)); Washington v. Brooks, 40 U.S.L.W. 2512
(Wash. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 1972).
10. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).
11. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6,1972 at H-2.
12. Id.
13. Joseph A. Pechman and Benjamin A. Okner of the Brookings In-
stitution.
14. The value added tax, already in use in several European countries,
is a national sales-type tax which, at every step of the journey from raw
material to retail sale, exacts a percentage of the increase in a product's
eventual sales price occasioned by the contribution made at that level.
15. Harrisburg Sunday Patriot-News, Feb. 6, 1972 at A-20.
16. See, e.g., "The Simmering VAT," TIME, Feb. 28, 1972 at 20.
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nance recommended that the "states take over the major burden
of paying for public schools"'17 and that their efforts be buttressed
by $4.6 billion to $7.8 billion of federal funds to be awarded during
the next five years on an incentive basis.' Presumably, states will
be expected to demand more tax dollars from their own citizens
primarily through the adoption or increase of progressive income
taxes. 19 There is also likely to be a trend toward statewide or re-
gional centralization.
The local government role in financing our public schools will
not completely disappear, however, and new methods will have to
be adopted to offset any losses caused by termination or restructur-
ing of the property tax system. In the light of nationwide munici-
pal fiscal bankruptcy and increased voter antipathy to new school
bond issues, present methods will prove inadequate. It is hypothe-
sized that some local governments and school districts, presumably
under the aegis of appropriate state enabling legislation,20 will at-
tempt to defray much of their new education cost through manda-
tory land dedications or equalization fee2' expropriations from resi-
dential subdividers. Where a land dedication is required, a per-
centage of the subdivider's entire tract is taken; where a fee is re-
quired, it is usually assessed per lot or per acre and collected as a
condition of plat approval or recordation. This Article will ex-
plore the constitutionality of such subdivision exactions with par-
ticular emphasis on the effect of recent decisions invalidating other
police power measures because of their exclusionary effect.
Reacting to the possible consequences of the statement by the
Illinois Supreme Court in 1917 that "in absence of any statute on
the subject, the owner of land might subdivide it in any way he
saw fit, having regard only to his own wishes and without regard
to public convenience," 22 state legislatures throughout the 1920's
and 1930's 23 passed enabling acts permitting their political subdi-
17. N.Y. Times, March 7, 1972 at 1.
18. Id.
19. Philadelphia Inquirer, Feb. 6, 1972 at H-2.
20. Apparently, at least 12 states have laws or constitutional provisions
that specifically permit cash levies on builders by school districts. "Why
Builders Donate Schools," Busnizss WEEK, October 9, 1971 at 58.
21. The equalization fee is sometimes substituted for land dedication
because, "[a]t least in the smaller subdivisions, the proposal to take dedi-
cations of modest amounts of land presented the problems of maintenance,
inadequate surface area, and inconvenient location among others." Haugen
v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108, 110 (1960).
22. People ex rel. Tilden v. Massieon, 279 Ill. 312, 315, 116 N.E. 639,
640 (1917).
23. Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
visions caught in the path of urban expansion to condition subdi-
vision plat approval on the installation of certain utilities and the
dedication of certain lands for various public purposes. 24 In the
past several decades, courts in various jurisdictions have upheld
these measures where they required the subdivider to dedicate
land or pay a fee in lieu thereof for streets, 25 curbs and gutters,
26
sewer systems,2 7 water systems,28 parks, playgrounds and recreation
land,29 and, in at least one instance, schools.3 0  Several lines of
thought are evident in the various justifications for these measures.
Beginning with the supposition that subdivision and sale is a
privilege rather than a right,3 1 it is felt that the required dedica-
tions act as a quid pro quo for the developer's "advantage and
privilege of having his plat recorded."3 2  One commentator has
viewed the developer as a businessman whose consumers should be
protected by the enactment of regulations which will ensure their
purchasing a product free from defects. The required dedications,
it is thought, will prevent the early deterioration of the subdivision
into a blight-spawning sIum.3 3 Doubtless, the installation of sewers,
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
24. Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The
Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 875 (1967). See also Comment,
Money Payment Requirements as Conditions to the Approval of Subdivi-
sion Maps: Analysis and Prognosis, 9 VILL. L. REV. 294 (1964); Reps and
Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 405 (1963);
Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods for Controlling Community Growth on
the Urban Fringe, 1961 WiscoNsiN L. REv. 370; Frey, Subdivision Control
and Planning, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 411; Reps, Control of Land Subdivision by
Municipal Planning Boards, 40 CORNELL L.Q. 258 (1955).
25. Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58
(1928); Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207
P.2d 1 (1949).
26. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
27. Stanco v. Suozzi, 11 Misc. 2d 784, 171 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1958).
28. Zastrow v. Village of Brown Deer, 9 Wis. 2d 100, 100 N.W.2d 359
(1960).
29. Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Ceek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), appeal
dismissed, 92 S. Ct. 202 (1972) (lack of a substantial federal question);
Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of City of Danbury,
160 Conn. 109, 273 A.2d 880 (1970); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone
County, 144 Mont. 25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scars-
dale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
30. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (no substantial federal ques-
tion).
31. Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 11 Cal. 3d 1129, 1139, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663 (1970), aff'd, 4 Cal.
3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), appeal dismissed, 92 S. Ct.
202 (1972) (lack of a substantial federal question).
32. Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 241 Mich. 468, 217 N.W. 58
(1928); accord, Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v.
City of Walnut Creek, 4 CaL 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971);
Ayres v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1
(1949).
33. Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The
Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 923 (1967).
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streets, water mains and sidewalks and the reservation of open
space confer practical and economic benefits on the homeowners.
The most commonly repeated justification for subdivision ex-
actions-and perhaps the most logical in light of subdivision regu-
lation's close interaction with zoning-is that it represents a valid
new exercise of the traditional police power. "What was at one
time regarded as an improper exercise of the police power may
now, because of changed living conditions, be recognized as a legiti-
mate exercise of that power. '3 4 Thus, almost all of the most re-
cent cases have opinions framed around the reasonable exercise of
the power in the interests of the health, safety, and general wel-
fare of the populace. When the police power is invoked as the im-
petus for the legislative expression, the burden cast upon the party
arguing against its validity is a heavy one; classically, if the ques-
tion be "fairly debatable," 35 its exercise will be upheld. These
opinions might have profitably repeated Justice Holmes' summary
of the police power in Noble State Bank v. Haskell:
3 0
It may be said in a general way that the police power ex-
tends to all the great public needs .... It may be put
forth in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the
prevailing morality or strong and preponderant opinion to
be greatly and immediately necessary to the public wel-
fare.
37
An analysis of the constitutionality of a purported police power
measure must begin with an assessment of the police power's
proper role:
It is all very well to speak generally of an absolute duty on
the part of a municipality to supply necessary school, high-
way and other facilities as it grows and expands in popu-
lation and as the need for increased facilities arises, but it
is clear that the duty of a municipality in this regard will
not bar it from the right to reasonably regulate. . . in the
interest of public welfare and to avoid unnecessary hard-
ship to individuals and taxpayers. The question should be
and is whether or not the action of the municipal authori-
ties is reasonable in a particular case.38
34. Miller v. Board of Public Works of City of Los Angeles, 195 Cal.
477, 484, 234 P. 381, 383 (1925).
35. Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518
(1942); cf. Christine Building Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116 N.W.2d
816, 820 (1962); Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont.
25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
36. 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
37. Id. at 111.
38. Josephs v. Town Board of Town of Clarkstown, 24 Misc. 2d 366,
369, 198 N.Y.S,2d 695, 699 (Sup. Ct. 1960) (upholding a 40,000 sq. ft. mini-
mum lot size).
Subdivision exactions and other legislative and administrative at-
temps to pass increasing costs on to the developer and, through
him, on to the home purchasers have not always been upheld when
questioned in court. One court held that an ordinance requiring a
dedication of 7% of lands intended for subdivision for recreation
purposes was arbitrary.3 9 Several courts have determined that the
municipality's or an administrator's act was unauthorized or ultra
vires.
40
The most important question in consideration of the validity of
subdivision exactions has been the extent to which the fee or dedi-
cation must be related to a need created by the influx of the new
residents in the subdivision. An early case held that a subdivision
fee or land dedication requirement of a subdivider would be valid
if the need sought to be offset by the exaction were "specifically
and uniquely attributable" 41 to his acts. The statement has been
cited repeatedly by courts rejecting exaction attempts.4 2  Thus,
while the requirement that a subdivider plot, pave and dedicate
streets within his subdivision is usually upheld, some courts have
balked at forcing a contribution for nearby streets or thoroughfares
which, while admittedly serving the burdened residents, would also
serve the rest of the municipality. 43  Clearly, a subdivider could
39. Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston, 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970).
40. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561
(1957) (no enabling authority for park and school site and drainage fees);
Beach v. Planning and Zoning Comm'n, 141 Conn. 79, 103 A.2d 814 (1954)
(rejection of plaintiff's application based on lack of schools and adequate
fire protection); Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167
N.E.2d 230 (1960) (no authority for collection of equalization fee for school
purposes); People ex Tel. Tilden v. Massieon, 279 I1. 312, 116 N.E. 639
(1917) (streets); Coronado Development Co. v. City of McPherson, 189
Kan. 174, 368 P.2d 51 (1962) (no authority to require cash for parks and
playgrounds); West Park Avenue, Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122,
224 A.2d 1 (1966) (minor officials exacting fee under duress without an
ordinance). The case of Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78,
271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966), illustrates an interesting lesson in
judicial non-restraint in construing legislation to find authorization for an
administrative act. There was no explicit authority in § 179-k of the
Village Law for the requirement of a fee in lieu of dedication. Neverthe-
less, the court construed the section allowing a waiver of the land dedication
requirement "subject to appropriate conditions and safeguards" as per-
mitting the fee payment alternative. Id. at 83, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958, 218
N.E.2d at 675, 18 N.Y.2d 83. The court in Rosen rejected a similar line of
reasoning. Curiously, the Village of Scarsdale subsequently amended its
regulations to specify the fee payment alternative. Johnston, Constitution-
ality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The Quest for a Rationale, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 871, 920-21 note 226 (1967).
41. Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230,
233 (1960).
42. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961); McKain v. Toledo City Plan-
ning Commission, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971). See gener-
ally Reps and Smith, Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 405 (1963).
43. People ex rel. Exchange National Bank of Chicago v. City of Lake
Forest, 40 IUI. 2d 281, 239 N.E.2d 819 (1968); Brazer v. Borough of Mountain-
side, 55 N.J. 456, 262 A.2d 857 (1970); Lomarch Corp. v. Mayor of Engle-
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not validly be asked to contribute to an off-site improvement with
no relation to his subdivision. Some courts, however, fearing that
the specifically-and-uniquely-attributable test would be read so
restrictively as to give the municipality an unreasonable burden of
proof, 44 have instead upheld the exaction attempt where related to
a special or specific need,4 ' thereby seeming to cast upon the de-
veloper the necessity of showing that his is one of "those extreme
and presumably rare cases where the burden of compliance is suf-
ficiently great to deter" 46 him from proceeding with his plans. It
has been said, however, that the exercise of the police power in this
manner without regard to a specifically-and-uniquely-attributable
test is a confiscation,47 a disguised exercise of the eminent domain
power without payment of compensation, 4 and an unequally as-
sessed tax for revenue-raising purposes, 49 all unconstitutional.
wood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968); McKain v. Toledo City Planning
Commission, 26 Ohio App. 2d 171, 270 N.E.2d 370 (1971). Contra, Jordan
v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965),
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 4 (1966):
We do not consider the fact that other residents of the village as
well as residents of the subdivision may make use of a public site
required to be dedicated by [a] subdivider for school, park, or
recreational purposes is particularly material to the constitutional
issue.
Id. at 623, 137 N.W.2d at 448.
44. Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d
442, 447 (1965), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 4 (1966) (no substantial fed-
eral question).
45. Id. Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont. 25,
294 P.2d 182 (1964); Maloco Realty Corp. v. Town of Brookhaven Planning
Bd., 34 App. Div. 2d 999, 312 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1970).
46. Johnston, Constitutionality of Subdivision Control Exactions: The
Quest for a Rationale, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 871, 917 (1967).
47. Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,
22 111. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961).
48. Id. at 383, 176 N.E.2d at 802; Ayres v. City Council of City of
Los Angeles, 34 Cal. 2d 31, 207 P.2d 1 (1949) (Carter, J. dissenting). But
cf. Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956).
49. Haugen v. Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1960). But cf.
Petterson v. City of Naperville, 9 Ill. 2d 233, 137 N.E.2d 371 (1956). See also
Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957),
where the court struck down an attempted 700% increase in building
permit fees sought to offset increased school costs caused by an increase in
population to be accommodated by the new buildings. Calling the meas-
ure tax-like, the court said it was an attempt
to defray the general cost of government under the guise of reim-
bursement for the special services required by the regulation and
control of new buildings....
The philosophy of this ordinance is that the tax rate of the
borough should remain the same and the new people coming
into the municipality should bear the burden of the increased costs
of their presence.
Id. at 362, 129 A.2d at 267.
The distinction between a demand of money under the police
power and one made under the power to tax is not so much one
Some courts, while perhaps accepting the rationale of the special
need test, have argued that failure to segregate the fee collections
into a fund whose expenditures are made solely to confer a direct
benefit on the burdened home purchasers invalidates the entire ex-
action scheme; reservation in a fund denoted for the limited pur-
pose underlying the exaction ordinance is, under this theory in-
sufficient.
Justice Van Voorhis' dissent in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scars-
dale,51 summarizes another objection to subdivision exactions for
purposes not related solely to the burdened subdivision.
The principle of decision in this case would constitutionally
allow municipal officers to prohibit real estate develop-
ment in cities, towns and villages unless the newcomers
pay whatever sums of money the local public authorities
may decide arbitrarily to impose upon them for the priv-
ilege of moving into the community, to be spent on
schools, public buildings, police and fire protection, parks
and recreation or any other general municipal purpose
past, present or to come, and without relation to special
benefits or assessed valuation.1
2
Rebuttals to this argument begin with a look at economic reality.
Where there is in force a subdivision exaction ordinance, whatever
assessment is made against the developer for land dedication 3 or
of form as of substance. * * If the purpose is regulation the
imposition ordinarily is an exercise of the police power, while if the
purpose is revenue the imposition is an exercise of the taxing
power and is a tax. If, therefore, the purpose is evident in any
particular instance, there can be no difficulty in classifying the
case and referring it to the proper power. * * * Only those cases
where regulation is the primary purpose can be specially referred
to the police power. If revenue is the primary purpose and regu-
lation is merely incidental the imposition is a tax.
4 COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed.) § 1784 at 3509.
50. Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal. App. 2d 631, 318 P.2d 561
(1957); Coronado Development Co. v. City of McPherson, 189 Kan. 174,
368 P.2d 51 (1962); Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966), rev'g, 23 App. Div. 2d 784, 258 N.Y.S.2d
777 (2d Dept. 1965) (Van Voorhis. J. dissenting); Haugen v. Gleason,
226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1966) ("The regulation cannot stand because it
fails to limit the use of money so produced to the direct benefit of the regu-
lated subdivision." 359 P.2d at 111); Jordan v. Village of Menomonee
Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442 (1965) (Hallows, J. dissenting);
cf. Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), appeal dis-
missed, 92 S. Ct. 202 (1972).
51. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
52. Id. at 86, 271 N.Y.S.2d 959-60, 218 N.E.2d 677. See also Haugen v.
Gleason, 226 Ore. 99, 359 P.2d 108 (1960); Associated Home Builders of
Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr.
630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), aff'g, 11 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663
(1970): "[E]xpropriation could be effected for any public purpose in any
instance by ruler and pen," id. at 1148, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 676, including argu-
ably, planned parenthood centers, abortion clinics, and day nurseries. Id.
at 1144, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 673-4.
53. 10-12% are common figures, HARR, LAND-USE PLANNING: A
CASEBOOK ON THE USE, MISUSE, AND RE-USE OF URBAN LAND, (2d ed.),
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1971 at 386.
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equalization fees5 4 is passed on to the homebuyers in the form of a
higher price on the home. In this view, the developer is seen
merely as a collector from the party intended to bear the cost.55
The exaction is then justifiable because it will require the residents
of the new subdivision to compensate long-time residents for hav-
ing borne the debt service and other capital costs on existing pub-
lic facilities from which the new residents will benefit. 58 What-
ever minor inequities are caused the new residents by an inability
to equalize both sides of this equation5" are deemed compensated
by the fact that these home buyers are receiving another kind of
subsidy in the form of government-insured, guaranteed mortgage
loans.58 The equalization fee device is properly seen as the proper
method to effectuate the exaction because of its flexibility. As a
matter of principle, the fee for educational purposes should be
charged according to the number of lots rather than the number
of acres since the latter should have no relationship to the burden
on educational facilities. Using principles of cost accounting, the
fee can then be fixed to reflect the proportion of the need for new
facilities specifically attributable to a particular subdivision.5"
This approach fails to account, however, for the fact that not
all residents of new subdivisions are new to the municipality.
Many, in fact, may be persons who have rented apartments or
owned homes in other parts of the same municipality and who
have, therefore, already paid the property taxes (renters in the
form of increased rent) used to defray capital costs; they would
suffer a double burden. Conceivably, the shortcoming could be
remedied by changing the chronological point at which the fee is
collected. Since, as noted earlier, charging the developer is essen-
tially a fiction because the cost will be passed on, there would seem
to be no compulsion against changing the chronological point of
collection from the plat approval, recordation, or building permit
stage to the later certificate of occupancy stage when the initial
54. $30 per lot and $100 per acre are common, Id.
55. Heyman and Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing Increased
Community Costs on New Suburban Residents Through Subdivision Exac-
tions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
56. Id.
57. For instance, the vacant land has, to an extent dependent upon its
assessed valuation, contributed to those same capital costs, West Park
Avenue, Inc. v. Township of Ocean, 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966).
58. Heyman and Gilhool, supra note 55, at 1137.
59. Id. at 1141-46. Perhaps this relationship of need to exaction was
what the court in Pioneer Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount
Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176 N.E.2d 799 (1961), was presaging when it
wrote that the subdivider "should not be obliged to pay the total cost of
remedying" a particular lack. 176 N.E.2d at 802 (emphasis added).
occupier of the burdened home should be ascertainable. An ap-
propriate fee reduction or waiver could then be administratively
determined upon the showing of proper prior residence creden-
tials. 0 Nevertheless, without adding another bureaucratic hege-
mony (i.e., one enforcing a system of registration for all of a munic-
ipality's new residents with a fee system calculated to equalize the
burden between new residents who choose to live in new subdi-
visions and those who do not, an equalization which, as a matter of
equal protection classification, would seem to be constitutionally
compelled) which would itself be of doubtful constitutional valid-
ity 1 to already overburdened municipal payrolls, it is doubtful
that the cost accounting method could account to the satisfaction
of long-time residents as well as new subdivision residents for new
residents of a municipality who will also use the existing facilities
but who choose not to live in new subdivisions. The cost account-
ing framework also fails to reconcile why a distinction should be
drawn between subdivision developers and builders who put up
high-rise apartment houses accommodating an equal or greater
number of new families without suffering an exaction.62 Further-
more, Justice Van Voorhis' statement taken to its harsh conclusion
would seem to invoke the fear that subdivision exactions could be
used to defray non-capital service costs as well. A municipality
might charge the cost of new teacher, firemen, and policemen sal-
aries to subdividers. Heyman and Gilhool, in their article, 62 dis-
tinguished new capital costs from new service costs as a proper
subject for exaction on the bases that: (1) the latter would proba-
bly be covered by taxes on the new residents and (2) no fiscal
emergency would be created by the usually slow increase in service
costs. It is unlikely, however, that a municipality's choice to legis-
late in the service cost area would be constitutionally barred ac-
cording to the cases which have upheld subdivision exactions.
60. The fee reduction and waiver system, it would seem, would also
require use of cost accounting methods. Note, however, the warning that
the legislative process would bog down if the legislature "were constitu-
tionally required to appriase beforehand the myriad situations to which it
wishes a particular policy to be applied and to formulate specific rules for
each situation." American Power and Light Co. v. Securities and Exchange
Commission, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946). This system, however, exposes what-
ever fallacy there is in the first instance in calling subdivision exactions
a proper exercise of the police power against subdividers. By placing the
cost directly upon the homebuyer to compensate for purported tax imbal-
ance, we seem to have slipped into an arena where analysis would be better
served by reference to the taxing power, a subject beyond the scope of this
paper.
61. See generally Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protection and
Application Under the Constitution, 40 UMKC L. Rsv. 66 (1971).
62. The equal protection problem created by this faulty distinction
should be remediable by ordinances which, as those involved in Rosen v.
Village of Downers Grove, 19 Ill. 2d 448, 167 N.E.2d 230 (1960) and Pioneer
Trust and Savings Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill. 2d 375, 176
N.E.2d 799 (1961), require fees or dedications according to living units as
well as residential sites.
63. 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
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The unconstitutionality of subdivision exactions for educa-
tional purposes is perhaps best illustrated by contrast with an ex-
action for open space park and recreation purposes upheld in Asso-
ciated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of Walnut
Creek.6 4 The first distinction is the nature of education itself.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function
of state and local governments. Compulsory school at-
tendance laws and the great expenditures for education
both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of ed-
ucation to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of
good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such
an opuortunity, where the state has undertaken to provide
it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.65
Even slight departures from economic equality in absorbing the
costs of public education are constitutionally infirm; that should
be the first lesson of Serrano v. Priest.0 "[The pivotal position
of education to success in American society and its essential role
in opening up to the individual the central experiences of our cul-
ture lend it an importance that is undeniable. '67 Courts have
questioned the absolute power of municipalities to compel sub-
dividers to help pay for education. "It is my opinion that any at-
tempt to compel a developer to pay for building a school, or to
donate land for a school, as a condition precedent to giving ... ap-
proval to a subdivision is violative of his constitutional rights.
"68
The lower court in the Associated Home Builders case, where a
2 acre dedication requirement for each 1000 new residents was
64. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971), appeal dis-
missed, 92 S. Ct. 202 (1972) (lack of a substantial federal question).
65. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also State
of Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 216-31 (1948)
(Frankfurter, J. concurring); Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Educational Op-
portunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State Financial Structures,
57 CAL. L. REV. 305, 362-63, 388-89 (1969).
66. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
67. Note, Development in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REV. 1065, 1129 (1969).
68. Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 68 N.J. Super.
197, 210, 172 A.2d 40 (1961), aff'd without opinion, 78 N.J. Super. 471, 189
A.2d 226 (App. Div. 1963).
upheld, echoed Justice Van Voorhis' fear. "We cannot subscribe to
the premise that the police power expands, and property rights
guaranteed by the Constitutions contract, in proportion to the gen-
eral fiscal exigencies which make expropriation attractive." 69 Nev-
ertheless, in upholding the exaction, the courts noted that it was
easy to relate new subdivisions to open space requirements, 70 par-
ticularly in California where the subdivisions are, as a rule, un-
usually large, sometimes with dimensions greater than existing
cities and forming communities unto themselves. The ordinance
was tightly drawn to maximize direct benefit to the burdened sub-
division, and waiver and fee equalization provisions eased all ap-
parent inequities. Another distinction lending validity to open
space dedication is that each subdivision while increasing demand
for open space also diminishes supply.7 1 Thus, with open space,
unlike education, a distinction between vertical influx of population
into apartment houses and horizontal influx into subdivisions is
proper because the former will not usually appreciably decrease the
supply of available recreation land. Similarly, high-density land
can be asked to contribute more open space than low-density land
even though the same number of new residents are brought in be-
cause, argues the court, the low-density residents would be less
likely to use common open space because of their substantial pri-
vate recreation areas.7 2 Education costs should be allocated only
according to the number of new residents.
Both the Superior Court and Supreme Court in the Associated
Home Builders case expressed a fear that the exaction device could,
when passed on to the home buyers, have an exclusionary effect.
While we recognize the ominous possibility that the con-
tributions required by a city can be deliberately set un-
reasonably high in order to prevent the influx of economi-
cally depressed persons into the community, a circum-
stance which would present serious social and legal prob-
lems, there is nothing to indicate that the enactments of
Walnut Creek in the present case raise such a spectre. 9
Use of the police power, particularly the zoning measure, as an ex-
clusionary device to retard the influx into suburban and rural
areas of persons wishing to escape the crush of urban life has re-
cently become the topic of much critical and analytical comment;7
4
69. 11 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 1143, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663, 673 (1970). See also
4 Cal. 3d 633, 642, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971).
70. Accord, Billings Properties, Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 144 Mont.
25, 394 P.2d 182 (1964).
71. Associated Home Builders of Greater East Bay, Inc. v. City of
Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633, 641, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 484 P.2d 606 (1971).
72. Id. at 645, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 640, 484 P.2d at 616.
73. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 648, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 642, 484 P.2d 606, 618 (1971);
see 11 Cal. App. 3d 1129, 1155, 90 Cal. Rptr. 663, 681 (1970) where the
matter was regarded as a legislative concern.
74. See, e.g., Comment, Discriminatory Zoning: Legal Battleground of
the Seventies, 21 Am. U. L. REv. 157 (1971); Low-Income Housing in the
Suburbs: The Problem of Exclusionary Zoning, 24 U. FLA. L. REV. 58 (1971);
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but the fear was cogently expressed in 1942 in Simon v. Town of
Needham,7 5 where a one-acre minimum lot size zoning ordinance
was upheld. The court said,
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of set-
ting up a barrier against the influx of thrifty and respecta-
ble citizens who desire to live there and who are able and
willing to erect homes upon lots upon which fair and rea-
sonable restrictions have been imposed nor for the purpose
of protecting the large estates that are already located in
the district. The strictly local interests of the town must
yield if it appears that they are plainly in conflict with the
general interests of the public at large.
76
While subsequent similar expressions have commonly been
aimed at large area minimum lot size zoning,"7 the exclusionary ef-
fect has also provoked criticism, if not invalidation, of other police
power measures. In Girsh Appeal,7 8 the court struck down a town-
ship's effort to entirely exclude new apartment house construction.
In Albrecht Realty Company v. Town of New Castle,7 9 the court
invalidated an attempt to restrict the number of building permits
to 112 per year. In his famous, vigorous dissent in Vickers v.
Township Committee of Gloucester Township,80 where the town-
ship-wide exclusion of mobile home parks was upheld, Justice Hall
said, "[t] he import of the holding gives almost boundless freedom to
developing municipalities to erect exclusionary walls on their
boundaries, according to local whim or selfish desire, and to use
the zoning power for aims beyond its legitimate purposes."8 1 The
measures are,
designed to let in as new residents only certain kinds of
Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74
DICK. L. REV. 634 (1970); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal Protection,
84 HARv. L. REV. 1645 (1971); Removing the Bar of Exclusionary Zoning to
a Decent Home, 32 Omo S. L.J. 373 (1971); Becker, Police Power and
Minimum Lot Size Zoning, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q. 263; Sager, Tight Little
Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN.
L. REV. 767 (1969); Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969); Note,
Gautreaux v. Public Housing Authority: Equal Protection and Public
Housing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 437 (1970).
75. 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
76. 42 N.E.2d at 519.
77. See Concord Township Appeal (Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.),
439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown
Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of
County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d
390 (1959). See also Molino v. Mayor and Council of Bor. of Glassboro,
116 N.J. Super. 195, 281 A.2d 401 (1971); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v.
Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971).
78. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
79. 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
80. 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
81. Id. at 252, 181 A.2d at 140.
people, or those who can afford to live in favored kinds of
housing, or to keep down tax bills of present property
owners ... [and they have the] effect of precluding peo-
ple who now live in congested and undesirable city areas
from obtaining housing within their means in open, attrac-
tive and healthy communities.8 2
Even before Associated Home Builders, subdivision exactions
were targeted as a possible exclusionary device. Justice Van Voor-
his, in his dissent in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale,8 3 said,
There is no constitutional authority, by this means, to pre-
vent city dwellers from migrating to the suburbs or coun-
try to live in tracts which are otherwise suitably devel-
oped, whenever it seems desirable to those who are al-
ready there to prevent them from coming except at a
price.
8 4
The court in West Park Avenue, Inc. v. Township of Ocean,85 men-
tioned that such exactions might "burden, perhaps intolerably, the
right of every citizen to seek a better home."8 6 It is also interesting
that the California Supreme Court stated in the Associated Home
Builders case, partially by analogy, that subdivision exactions have
been compared to "admittedly valid zoning regulations such as
minimum lot size ... requirements. 8T In National Land and In-
vestment Company v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment,88
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania invalidated a four-acre mini-
mum lot size zoning ordinance. 8 The court, after an analysis of
the alleged police power general welfare justifications (sewage dis-
posal difficulties, water pollution danger, inadequate roads and
fire protection, and preservation of the area's character), inquired
into the underlying motivation for the ordinance and determined
that it was designed primarily to prevent the entrance of newcom-
ers and avoid future economic burdens. The court subsequently
undertook a similar analysis and came to the same conclusion in
82. Id. at 265-66, 181 A.2d at 147.
83. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955, 218 N.E.2d 673 (1966).
84. Id. at 86-87, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 960, 218 N.E.2d at 677.
85. 48 N.J. 122, 224 A.2d 1 (1966).
86. Id. at 127, 224 A.2d at 4. See also "Why Builders Donate Schools,"
BusINEss WEEK, October 9, 1971, p. 58, where Michael Heyman, a professor
of law and city planning at the University of California, Berkeley, was
quoted: "Passing the bill for schools and other facilities on to developers
isn't a very rational way of spreading municipal costs. It ends up raising
the price of suburban housing well above what moderate and low income
families can afford."
87. 4 Cal. 3d 633, 644-45, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 639, 484 P.2d 606, 615
(1971). See also Heyman and Gilhool, supra note 55, 73 YALE L.J. 1119,
1123 (1964).
88. 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965).
89. Cf. Christine Building Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, 116
N.W.2d 816 (1962) (21,780 sq. ft.); Bismark v. Incorporated Village of
Bayville, 49 Misc. 2d 604, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (40,000 sq. ft.);
Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107
S.E.2d 390 (1959) (two acres). See generally MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 40B, §§ 20-23 (Supp. 1970).
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both Girsh Appeal 0 and Concord Township Appeal.9 1
This investigation into the motives of public officials 92 has be-
gun to spread into the courtrooms and other public arenas of other
jurisdictions, often producing anger and vituperation. 3 Courts are
being forced to abandon the traditional shield of burden of proof,
whereby the person contending the invalidity of a zoning ordinance
had to show clearly that it was unreasonable, arbitrary or capri-
cious and without a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals or general welfare,94 and look "at the larger issue of the re-
lationship of suburban restrictions to urban problems." '9 5
The burden of proof has become another area of recent change
where the spectre of exclusion has been raised. Justice Hall noted
that it is "virtually impossible for municipal zoning regulations to
be successfully attacked"96 and suggested that, where the munici-
pality's action appears to approach a doubtful extreme, the burden
of going forward be placed upon the municipality. 97 National
Land and Investment borrowed this advice, noting that the su-
perior resources available to the municipality to meet the costs of
litigation should militate against making the other party's burden
too onerous. 98 Recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court went
further and reversed the burden of proof as to police power justi-
fication where the citizen had demonstrated that the questioned
zoning ordinance completely excluded his desired use from the en-
tire municipality.99
The earlier fears that subdivision exactions would have an ex-
clusionary effect seem to have materialized. Even the cost ac-
counting proponents recognize that "cost accounting as a constitu-
tional test may permit exactions that will significantly increase the
price of the house."'10 0 Chicago area builders are already donating
90. 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970).
91. 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970).
92. Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph
Girsh, 74 Dixm. L. REV. 634 (1970).
93. See "The Battle of the Suburbs," NEWSWEEK, November 15, 1971,
p. 69, where the controversies raging in Mahwah, N.J. and Blackjack, Mo.
are reported. A similar incident is also taking place in Oyster Bay, Long
Island.
94. Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va.
653, 107 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1959).
95. Washburn, supra note 92, 74 DicK. L. REV. 634, 651 (1970).
96. Vickers v. Township Committee of Gloucester Township, 37 N.J.
232, 259, 181 A.2d 129, 143 (1962) (Hall, J. dissenting).
97. Id. at 260-61, 181 A.2d at 144.
98. 419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965).
99. Beaver Gasoline Company v. Zoning Hearing Board, 445 Pa. 571,
285 A.2d 501 (1971).
100. Heyman and- Gilhool, supra note 55, 73 YALE L.J. 1119, 1156
(1964). The authors' model results in a $730 per house fee.
land and paying $50 to $200 per new house to school districts and
some builders claim that the trend may boost the cost of new
homes anywhere from 1% to 5% per year.' 0' It is questionable
whether such measures can withstand constitutional attack, at least
in some jurisdictions. Nevertheless, the ordinances exist, and re-
gardless of whatever "serious harm [may be] done to accepted
egalitarian ends, [they may] find their justification in the effectu-
ation of governmental ends of overriding importance,"1 02 at least
until the United States Supreme Court faces them. Until then,
courts of less jurisdiction could and should adopt a broadened,
more active concept of judicial review in scrutinizing subdivision
ordinances for educational purposes by requiring that the amount
and method of exaction be related to the specific need created by
the subdivision and by requiring that the fees collected be segre-
gated into a special fund not only for the exact purpose underlying
the ordinance but also for the direct benefit of the contributing sub-
divisions. Apartment dwellers should be required to suffer the
same burden as residents of single-family homes, an dno distinctions
should be drawn on the basis of density.
In addition, access to judicial review should be quickly and
easily available; otherwise the very delay in litigation, because the
subdivider's land is tied up, will act as a coercive measure weaken-
ing his resolve to contest the issue. The traditional burden of proof
should be relaxed, if not reversed, and the court might require a
municipality to demonstrate that it has made a thorough study of
environmental needs 0 3 and that it is taking all other available
steps to remedy the school situation.
10 4
It has been suggested that the relationship between the pur-
pose and effect of public action is "a type of examination which
may be unsuited for the judiciary."'1 5 In that case, it behooves
legislatures which authorize municipalities to enact educational
subdivision exaction ordinances to set a reasonably low maximum
amount against which the ordinance must be compared'0 6 and to
create a state-wide expert review board with appropriate variance
power, preferably insulated from the political process, to review
each municipality's ordinance.'
0 7
101. "Why Builders Donate Schools," BusINEss WEEK, October 9, 1971,
p. 58.
102. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exelusionary Zoning, Equal Protec-
tion and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767, 791 (1969).
103. See Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137
N.W.2d 442 (1965), af'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).
104. See Josevhs v. Town Board of Town of Clarkstown, 24 Misc. 2d
366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
105. Washburn, supra note 92, 74 DICK. L. REV. 634, 650 (1970); accord,
Large Lot Zoning, 78 YALE L.J. 1418 (1969).
106. Heyman and Gilhool, supra note 55, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
107. A similar proposal for minimum lot size zoning appears in Large
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